The Electoral Revenge of Czech ‘Pork-Eaters’

The Czech elections were not a triumph for pro-European and pro-Ukrainian parties. But they were not a disaster either, with the extremes receiving less support than anticipated. 

Czechs chose to become more pragmatic and probably more selfish. The October 3-4 vote saw the furthest elements of both left and right weakened or defeated, although at least one hard-right party is likely to join the new government. 

The incumbent coalition, which strongly supported Ukraine, was comprehensively beaten, with the main opposition ANO party of billionaire Andrej Babiš winning 34.5%, a significant rise on its 2021 result. The coalition parties were punished for a dismal economic record, including severe cost-of-living pressures, and for disdaining the rural electorate, which turned out in record numbers despite, or because of, hostile campaigning. 

It might be expected that European politicians would have learned from Hilary Clinton’s mistake of referring to 2016 Trump voters as “deplorables.” They apparently haven’t. Supporters of Prime Minister Petr Fiala’s Czech government happily branded opposition electors as “desolates” and “pork eaters.”  

Turnout rose to the highest since the first post-revolutionary vote of 1990. Yet the increase came not from the mobilization of young pro-Western voters, but appeared to be rooted among older voters from small towns, regions, and the countryside. These electors apparently heard the insults and Babiš’s messages, but not the coalition’s radical warnings in the final days of the campaign that the country could be kidnapped by the East. 

What next? 

ANO was the clear winner, with 80 of the 200 lower house seats. It wants to rule with the Motorists (13 seats), a party strongly opposed to green and climate change policies, but not opposed to the European Union (EU) or NATO, but it will also need support from the SPD (15 seats), an anti-EU and anti-NATO party with strong anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.  

There are some paradoxes. Fiala’s departing government managed to create a popular impression that it took more care of Ukrainians than of Czechs (the country of 10 million houses close to 400,000 refugees), yet the pro-Ukraine messaging did not translate into very much financial assistance.  

Czech financial backing for Ukraine places it 22^nd, far behind its neighbor, Slovakia, and among the lowest in Europe. It is a piece of astonishing political art to be blamed for doing more for Ukrainians than for your own population, while in fact doing very little. 

It is certainly true that the Czechs have given moral support to Ukraine, provided significant military help, and organized a munitions initiative, which was based on the enthusiastic work of Czech diplomats but financed by countries like Denmark and the Netherlands. 

In the first hours after the results, there was a sense of relief among Czech mainstream commentators, who are certainly not pro-Babiš, and most agreed it could have been worse. Stačilo! (Enough!), the radical left-wing, communist, post-communist, and pro-Russian coalition did not make it into parliament, for example.  

Polls predicted 7% support for the grouping, but it ended up at 4.6% and therefore below the 5% threshold for seats. The hard-right SPD was forecast to win 12%, but ended up with less than 8%. ANO had siphoned support from both parties. 

There were some serious miscalculations by the governing parties. Firstly, the Pirates, mainstream Western-standard progressives focused on young people, ended up with only about 9% of the vote. The support of young voters was evenly spread, and the illusion that young people should prevail because they are the future of the country was proved false. There will always be a new wave and a new generation of old people with socially conservative attitudes, all of them constantly complaining.  

Secondly, the government apparently failed to grasp that elections are about the economy. Living standards and real wages are back at 2019 levels even as neighbors like Poland maintain dynamic growth. Rather than address this, the government told voters they are doing very well and shouldn’t complain. The most important issue, they were informed, was remaining part of the West. 

Many in the Western media will now say the country is treading the Slovakian and Hungarian path, but this is not going to happen. The Czech system includes an upper chamber, the Senate, which uses an electoral system that ensures it will always be dominated by the traditional and broadly centrist parties.  

And President Petr Pavel, who has a strong popular mandate, is very pro-Western. There is also a strong and active Constitutional Court. Any attempt to increase control of public broadcasting, for example, will be rejected. 

Babiš consistently campaigned every day for four years, travelling through towns and villages and managing to mobilize the voters who had backed him in the presidential elections. While he lost to Pavel in the 2023 presidential race, his 40% support was enough to convert into a parliamentary victory. He proved to his opponents that hard work matters.  

And what about the Ukraine policy? ANO wants to end the Czech munitions initiative, although it was soon set to expire anyway since the old Soviet-caliber munitions at the heart of the program are now very limited — as are financial resources. The burden of support for Ukraine is now likely to fall even more on countries like Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands. 

Social aid to Ukrainian refugees within the Czech Republic was always very limited and focused on encouraging them to work. The Czech economy is dependent on them as construction and factory workers, and as nurses and supermarket cashiers, and no one will send them home.  

Cancelling the order of prepaid F-35 jets will also not happen under Babiš unless he wants to upset Donald Trump, and the same goes for him halting the gradual rise in defense spending to 5% of GDP. Babiš may not be keen on either of these, but he is likely to be pragmatic.  

Jan Macháček is a visiting fellow of Globsec, president of Strategeo Institute, and member of the board of foreign policy advisors to the Czech President Petr Pavel. He is a former dissident, musician, and university lecturer. A heating stoker during communism, he worked on the weekly publication Respekt after the 1989 revolution. 

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