Action includes dozens of targets facilitating the full cycle of Houthi fundraising, smuggling, and attack operations
WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is designating 32 individuals and entities and identifying four vessels in Treasury’s largest sanctions action to date targeting Iran-backed Ansarallah, commonly known as the Houthis. The networks targeted today are part of the Houthis’ global illicit fundraising, smuggling, and weapons procurement operations, and include Houthi-associated companies, their owners, and other key Houthi operatives located in Yemen, China, the United Arab Emirates, and the Marshall Islands.
“The Houthis continue to threaten U.S. personnel and assets in the Red Sea, attack our allies in the region, and undermine international maritime security in coordination with the Iranian regime,” said Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence John K. Hurley. “We will continue applying maximum pressure against those who threaten the security of the United States and the region.”
Those targeted today finance and facilitate the Houthis’ acquisition of advanced military-grade materials, including ballistic missile, cruise missile, and unmanned aerial vehicle components, used to attack United States forces and our allies, as well as commercial shipping in the Red Sea. These attacks have resulted in numerous civilian deaths and directly threaten both the U.S. economy and global commerce, as well as the broader peace and stability of the Middle East. The Houthis generate substantial revenue by importing oil and other commodities through ports under their control, overseeing complex smuggling operations, and laundering vast sums of money on behalf of senior Houthi leadership. The proceeds from these illicit activities finance the Houthis’ global weapons supply chain, which relies on procurement operatives, front companies, shipping facilitators, and various suppliers.
Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended, and builds on OFAC’s actions from June 17, 2024, July 31, 2024, October 2, 2024, December 19, 2024, March 5, 2025, April 2, 2025, April 28, 2025, June 20, 2025, and July 22, 2025 targeting Houthi leaders, smugglers, financiers, procurement operatives, and suppliers. This action is also consistent with Treasury’s implementation of National Security Presidential Memorandum 2 (NSPM-2), directing a campaign of maximum economic pressure on Iran, as well as its terrorist proxy the Houthis. The U.S. Department of State designated Ansarallah as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, effective February 16, 2024, and subsequently designated the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on March 5, 2025.
HOUTHI STATE CAPTURE AND CORRUPTION
The Houthis use fraudulent legal pretenses to seize state and private assets, appointing loyal affiliates to manage these stolen companies and properties, generating hundreds of millions of dollars for the terrorist group. On November 18, 2021, OFAC designated Saleh Mesfer Alshaer (Alshaer), who, as the Houthi-appointed “Judicial Custodian,” oversaw the Houthi’s violent and extortionate seizure of state-owned and private assets in Sana’a and across Yemen, resulting in the expropriation of property exceeding $100 million in value. Following Alshaer’s designation, the Houthis appointed Salih Dubaysh as Alshaer’s replacement. In this role, Dubaysh confiscated public and private property on behalf of the Houthis, under the pretext that the previous owners committed treason against the terrorist group.
During his tenure as Judicial Custodian, Alshaer distributed a portion of the seized assets to his family members to manage, with the goal of enriching the Houthis and preserving the group’s control over the assets. OFAC is designating one of Alshaer’s family members today: Abdullah Mesfer Al-Shaer (Abdullah), his brother. In 2019, Alshaer appointed Abdullah as the Chairman of General Holding Corporation for Real Estate and Investment (Shibam Holding), as well as private security company Yemen Armored Comprehensive Security Services and Exhibitions Organization Company Ltd (Yemen Armored). Working in close coordination with senior Houthi officials, Abdullah directs these companies’ profits to finance the Houthis’ military activities.
The Houthis confiscated Shibam Holding following the terrorist group’s takeover of Sana’a in 2014. The company, with estimated assets of $500 million, operates as a tool for money laundering and financing for the Houthis through investments in the real estate, exchange, and communications sectors. Khaled Muhammad Khalil (Khalil), Head of the Economic Department of the Houthi Security and Intelligence Service (HSIS), manages acquisitions and facilitates money laundering for the Houthis, including through Shibam Holding, in coordination with Abdullah. Khalil also oversees the collection of fees and taxes from exchange and commercial companies operating in Yemen for HSIS. Khalil has extorted merchants, businessmen, and money changers who refused to launder money for the Houthis.
Ibrahim Mohsen Al Suwaidi (Al Suwaidi) has laundered money for the Houthis and was one of the key figures in Shibam Holding that facilitated the Houthis’ acquisition of a large company, which was used to generate revenue for the group.
In 2017, the Houthis seized Kamaran Industry and Investment Company (Kamaran) and appointed a loyal figure to take control of the company’s assets. Kamaran is a Yemeni tobacco company founded in 1963, which, since the Houthi takeover, has provided millions of dollars to the terrorist group. In 2024, the Houthis appointed Mohammed Ahmed Al-Dawla as the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Kamaran to extract further profits from the company for the Houthis.
Salih Dubaysh, Abdullah Meser Al-Shaer, Ibrahim Mohsen Al-Suwaidi, Khaled Muhammad Khalil, Mohammed Ahmed Al-Dawla, General Holding Corporation for Real Estate Development and Investment, Yemen Armored Comprehensive Security Services and Exhibitions Organization Company Ltd, and Kamaran Industry and Investment Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Houthis.
HOUTHI PETROLEUM SMUGGLERS
Mohammad Abdulsalam, who was designated on March 5, 2025 pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, oversees a network of hundreds of Houthi-affiliated businesses importing Iranian oil products into Yemen, collectively valued at one billion dollars. Zaid Ali Yahya Al Sharafi (Al Sharafi) and Saddam Ahmad Mohammad Al Faqih (Al Faqih) are two key operatives who work together as part of Abdulsalam’s petroleum smuggling network. Within this web of companies, Al Faqih owns Al Faqih International Trade, Import, and Oil Services Limited; Sam Oil Company for Trade and Oil Services Ltd (Sam Oil); and Royal Plus Petroleum Derivatives Import.
Al Sharafi is a Yemen-based money launderer and trader who is regarded as an important Houthi financial official. Al Sharafi manages a significant network of Yemen-based petroleum companies, some owned by Houthi leaders, including Sam Oil and Azal Company. Al Sharafi personally owns Silm Road Company for Trading and Importing and Oil Primer Company. These companies under Al Sharafi’s ownership and management smuggle oil into Yemen and generate revenue for the Houthis.
Zaid Ali Yahya Al Sharafi, Saddam Ahmad Mohammad Al Faqih, Al Faqih International Trade, Import, and Oil Services Limited, Sam Oil Company for Trade and Oil Services Ltd, Azal Company, and Royal Plus Petroleum Derivatives Import are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. Silm Road Company for Trading and Importing and Oil Primer Company are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Zaid Ali Yahya Al Sharafi.
HOUTHI-LINKED MARITIME SHIPPING COMPANIES
The Houthis also maintain networks of front companies and illicit shipping facilitators outside of Yemen to manage their maritime operations and evade international scrutiny. On June 20, 2025 and April 28, 2025, OFAC identified five vessels and designated their owners for involvement in the discharge of refined petroleum products at Houthi-controlled ports after the expiration of OFAC Counterterrorism General License (GL) 25A. Additionally, on April 2, 2025, Treasury identified one vessel and designated its owners for money laundering and shipping activities benefiting the Houthis, to include the loading and shipping of stolen wheat from Ukraine to Houthi-controlled territory. The following vessels and companies facilitated the discharge of oil at Ras Isa and conducted shipping activities on behalf of the Houthis.
United Arab Emirates-based Tyba Ship Management DMCC (Tyba) is owned by Muhammad Al-Sunaydar, a Houthi-linked businessman designated by Treasury on July 22, 2025, who coordinated portions of the management and accounting of Tyba’s vessels with Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC, a Houthi-affiliated entity that OFAC concurrently designated on July 22, 2025. Tyba operates the Barbados-flagged STAR MM (IMO 9186625) and Antigua and Barbuda-flagged NOBEL M (IMO 9228784)oil tankers, which discharged oil for Arkan Mars Petroleum DMCC at Houthi-controlled port Ras Isa in late May 2025. Tyba also operates the Panama-flagged BLACK ROCK (IMO 9196448) and Antigua and Barbuda-flagged SHRIA (IMO 917347) oil tankers. Al-Sunaydar also owns Marshall Islands-based MT Tevel Incorporated (MT Level Inc) and Star MM Inc. MT Tevel Inc is the registered owner of the NOBEL M, and Marshall Islands-based Star MM Inc. is the registered owner of the STAR MM and the SHRIA.
Tyba Ship Management DMCC, MT Tevel Inc., Star MM Inc. are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. The STAR MM, the NOBEL M, the BLACK ROCK, and the SHRIA are being identified pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, as property in which Tyba Ship Management DMCC has an interest.
SUPPLIERS TO THE HOUTHIS
Dual-use components and military-grade materials the Houthis acquire from commercial suppliers are, in turn, used to target innocent civilians and disrupt freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
Hubei Chica Industrial Co., Ltd. (Hubei Chica) is a China-based chemical supplier that has coordinated with key Houthi procurement operatives to supply bulk quantities of chemical precursors used to manufacture ballistic missiles, explosives, and other advanced weapon systems inside Yemen. Representatives of Hubei Chica have assisted the Houthis in falsifying shipping documents, enabling the Houthis to hide their ongoing procurement of chemical precursors and circumvent China’s export controls.
Shenzhen Shengnan Trading Co., Ltd (Shenzhen Shengnan) is a China-based logistics company that has conducted multiple shipments of dual-use electronic components to Houthi front companies in Yemen. The Houthis use these components to manufacture unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other weapon systems. Shenzhen Shengnan has supported Houthi smuggling operations by mislabeling the contents of shipments containing UAV and other dual-use items that were destined for Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
The China-based Shanxi Shutong Import and Export Trade Co. Ltd. (Shanxi Shutong), under the supervision of the company’s owner, Ying Li (Li), has shipped hundreds of thousands of tons of chemical precursors destined for the Houthis, including chemicals that Houthi operatives use to manufacture motors for ballistic missiles and explosives. Shanxi Shutong operates through its subsidiary, Shandong Mingming New Material Technology Co., Ltd. (Shandong Mingming).
Hubei Chica Industrial Co., Ltd., Shenzhen Shengnan Trading Co., Ltd., and Shanxi Shutong Import and Export Trade Co. Ltd. are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. Shandong Mingming New Material Technology Co., Ltd. is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shanxi Shutong Import and Export Trade Co. Ltd. Ying Li is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for owning or controlling, directly or indirectly, Shanxi Shutong Import and Export Trade Co. Ltd.
HOUTHI PROCUREMENT FRONT COMPANIES
The Houthis rely on a network of front companies to identify suppliers, conduct transactions, and arrange for the shipment of dual-use goods to Houthi-controlled areas.
Yiwu Wan Shun Trading Company Limited (Yiwu Wan Shun) is one such China-based Houthi front company. Since at least 2021, Yiwu Wan Shun has coordinated large-scale procurement and shipment of UAV components and other dual-use items from China-based suppliers that are critical to the Houthis’ weapons manufacturing efforts. Prominent Houthi procurement operatives, including U.S.-designated Houthi procurement operative Ibrahim Al-Nashiri, have used Yiwu Wan Shun to purchase industrial equipment in support of Houthi militants.
Houthi operatives also leverage front companies in Yemen to purchase dual-use weapons components, such as the Sana’a-based Irtiqa for Development and Qualification Technical Institute (IQDI). IQDI is closely linked to key Houthi militant leaders who use IQDI to procure dual-use components from commercial suppliers, manufacture UAVs and other advanced weapon systems in support of Houthi attacks, and experiment with new weapon designs. Over the past two years, IQDI has been instrumental to the Houthis’ efforts to improve the capabilities of their one-way attack UAVs and other weapon systems.
Yiwu Wan Shun Trading Company Limited and Irtiqa for Development and Qualification Technical Institute are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis.
HOUTHI SHIPPING FACILITATORS OF MILITARY COMPONENTS
The Houthis leverage a global network of shipping and logistics companies to transport military-grade components from commercial suppliers to their terrorist forces in Yemen.
The China-based logistics company Guangzhou Yakai International Freight Forwarding Co., Ltd. (Guangzhou YK) has facilitated numerous shipments of dual-use components and other military-grade materials in support of the Houthis’ weapons development efforts. Guangzhou YK has repeatedly arranged for shipments of dual-use goods from the China to Houthi front companies located in Yemen, as well as other locations in neighboring countries. Guangzhou YK is apparently trusted with some of the Houthis’ most important shipments of dual-use components.
Guangzhou Nahari Trading Co., Ltd. (Guangzhou Nahari) is a China-based Houthi-associated shipping company that has supported the Houthis’ commercial procurement efforts in China. Guangzhou Nahari has procured dual-use items and other components from China-based suppliers, which it has then obscured in shipments destined for Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen.
China-based Yemeni national Mohammed Abdulwasea Hael Al-Nahari (Mohammed Al-Nahari) is the sole supervisor of Guangzhou Nahari, which he co-owns with another China-based Yemeni national, Hisham Abdulwasea Hael Mohammed Al-Nahari (Hisham Al-Nahari). Using Guangzhou Nahari, Mohammed Al-Nahari collaborates with Hisham Al-Nahari to arrange shipments of dual-use items from China to Yemen in support of Houthi military procurement efforts. Hisham Al-Nahari further facilitates Houthi acquisition of components for weapons production by obfuscating shipments with licit cargo.
Al-Hammadi Trading, Shipping, and Clearance Co., Ltd. (Al-Hammadi Company) is a China-based, Houthi-associated logistics company that has procured and shipped dual-use components from China in support of the Houthis’ military efforts. Representatives of Al-Hammadi Company collaborate with other Houthi operatives located in China. China-based Yemeni national Nasr Hussein Al-Hammadi (Al-Hammadi) owns Al-Hammadi Company, which he uses to facilitate the acquisition and shipment of dual-use components from China to Yemen in support of the Houthis.
Guangzhou Yakai International Freight Forwarding Co., Ltd., Guangzhou Nahari Trading Co., Ltd., Hisham Abdulwasea Hael Mohammed Al-Nahari, Al-Hammadi Trading, Shipping, and Clearance Co., Ltd., and Nasr Hussein Al-Hammadi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the Houthis. Mohammed Abdulwasea Hael Al-Nahari is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being a leader or official of Guangzhou Nahari Trading Co., Ltd.
SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS
As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons.
Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.
Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority.
The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List.
Click here for more information on the persons designated and any property identified as blocked today.
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